Populism, Political Pressure and Central Bank (in)Dependence
Donato Masciandaro () and
Francesco Passarelli ()
Open Economies Review, 2020, vol. 31, issue 3, No 7, 705 pages
Abstract This article analyses the relationships between inequality, political pressure, populism and central bank independence (CBI). If there is financial inequality across citizens, monetary policies yield distributional consequences. Political pressure on central bank will increase. A populist wave fuelled by large demand for redistribution with no regard to long term consequences may undermine actual CBI.
Keywords: Populism; Monetary policy; Central bank Independence; Inequality; Political economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 E31 E52 E58 E62 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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