Central bank independence and sacrifice ratios

Andreas Fischer ()

Open Economies Review, 1996, vol. 7, issue 1, 5-18

Abstract: Do countries with independent central banks enjoy lower output costs during disinflation? Credibility should allow independent central banks to adjust quicker and thereby suffer lower output costs. The objective of this study is to test the credibility hypothesis that countries with independent central banks suffer lower output losses over a disinflationary cycle than do countries with less independent central banks. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Keywords: central bank independence; sacrifice ratios (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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DOI: 10.1007/BF01886126

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