Joint-Product Export Smuggling and Export Tax Policy

Scott Fausti

Open Economies Review, 1997, vol. 8, issue 1, 69 pages

Abstract: The effect of smuggling on tax revenue collection and the revenue-maximizing tax rate is an unresolved issue in the smuggling literature. Clandestine and joint-product smuggling models arrive at different conclusions concerning smuggling's effect on tax revenue collection and the revenue-maximizing tax rate. Clandestine (joint-product) smuggling is consistent with the assumption that legal and illegal trade are substitutable (complementary) activities for the exporting firm. The effect of smuggling on the tax rate and tax revenue is shown to be dependent on whether smuggling and legal trade are assumed to be complementary or substitutable activities. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

Keywords: smuggling; joint-product effect; revenue-maximizing tax rate; commercial policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1008293216735

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