International Standards for IP Protection and R&D Incentives Revisited

Laurel Adams ()

Open Economies Review, 1998, vol. 9, issue 4, 343-348

Abstract: Aoki and Prusa (1993), Journal of International Economics, examine the effects of differing standards of IPRs protection on the R&D intensity of home country firms. This paper builds on this work by examining the R&D outcomes of home country firms when foreign rivals imitate rather than innovate. In infant industries, full commitment to discriminatory protection always leads to the most R&D. In mature industries, full commitment to discriminatory protection leads to reduced R&D intensity. This contrasts with the dynamic case where discriminatory protection, by relaxing a binding cash in advance constraint, leads to more R&D than does uniform protection. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Keywords: innovation; imitation; discriminatory IPRs protection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1008365431532

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