Flexible Integration, EMU and Relative Voting Power in the EU

Matthias Sutter

Public Choice, 2000, vol. 104, issue 1, 62 pages

Abstract: This paper studies the implications offlexible integration in the European Union. Itanalyses the voting power of member states in theCouncil of Ministers when differently sized subgroupsof the EU are set up. European Monetary Union isreferred to as the most important example of flexibleintegration. The Banzhaf-Index is calculated to studythe distribution of voting power in the decisionmaking process according to the stability and growthpact. The results show considerable fluctuations,especially for smaller countries, in relative votingpower, the latter being defined as the relationbetween voting power and relative voting weight. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1005054731693

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