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Sequential Contests

John Morgan

Public Choice, 2003, vol. 116, issue 1-2, 18 pages

Abstract: We compare expected rent-seeking expenditures and efficiency of simultaneous versus sequential rent-seeking contests. We find that when two risk neutral ex ante identical agents are competing, sequential contests are ex ante Pareto superior to simultaneous contests. We then endogenize the timing decision of rent-seeking expenditures and show that with ex ante identical contestants, all subgame perfect equilibria of this game are sequential contests. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2003
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