Election campaigns, agenda setting and electoral outcomes

Manfred Holler () and Peter Skott

Public Choice, 2005, vol. 125, issue 1, 215-228

Abstract: Framing effects and bounded rationality imply that election campaigns may be an important determinant of election outcomes. This paper uses a two-party setting and simple game theoretic models to analyse the strategic interaction between the parties' campaign decisions. Alternations of power emerge naturally, even if both electoral preferences and party positions remain constant. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Election campaigns, agenda setting and electoral outcomes (2004)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-3417-4

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