Election campaigns, agenda setting and electoral outcomes

Manfred Holler () and Peter Skott
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Manfred Holler: University of Hamburg

UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers from University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics

Abstract: Framing effects and bounded rationality imply that election campaigns may be an important determinant of election outcomes. This paper uses a two-party setting and simple game theoretic models to analyse the strategic interaction between the parties’ campaign decisions. Alternations of power emerge naturally, even if both electoral preferences and party positions remain constant.

Keywords: Election; campaign platforms; agenda setting; cost of ruling; Condorcet (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Journal Article: Election campaigns, agenda setting and electoral outcomes (2005)
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