A law and economics perspective on terrorism

Nuno Garoupa, Jonathan Klick () and Francesco Parisi

Public Choice, 2006, vol. 128, issue 1, 147-168

Abstract: This paper reviews the existing law and economics literature on crime, noting where various models might apply to the terror context. Specifically, it focuses on two strands of the literature, deterrence and incapacitation. It considers anti-terror measures enacted by different countries, highlighting how the details of the laws correspond to the insights from economic models of crime. In conclusion, the paper proposes an efficient sorting mechanism in which individuals will be provided with incentives to reveal their type to law enforcement authorities. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006

Keywords: Terrorism; Penalty enhancements; Communal liability; Organized crime; Basic crime model; Deterrence; Incapacitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: A Law and Economics Perspective on Terrorism (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:128:y:2006:i:1:p:147-168

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9058-4

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