An experimental analysis of voting in the Stability and Growth Pact in the European Monetary Union
Bernd Irlenbusch () and
Matthias Sutter ()
Public Choice, 2006, vol. 129, issue 3, 417-434
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in the European Monetary Union shall deter countries from running excessive deficits by the threat of punishment, executed conditional on the outcome of a multistage voting procedure. We examine voting behaviour in an experiment which closely resembles the SGP’s design and find that the SGP enables larger countries to block punishment more often than smaller countries. In addition, we study an institutional modification of the SGP by excluding countries with excessive deficits from voting on other ‘fiscal sinners’. Our findings clearly suggest that this innovation would give the SGP sharper teeth than it actually has in reality. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006
Keywords: Stability and Growth Pact; Experiment; Voting; Public bad; Punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:129:y:2006:i:3:p:417-434
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II
More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().