Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest

Lambert Schoonbeek

Public Choice, 2007, vol. 131, issue 3, 453-464

Abstract: We consider delegation in a rent-seeking contest with two players, where delegates have more instruments at their disposal than the main players. We endogenize both the decision to hire a delegate and the contingent fee offered to the delegates. We characterize the situations when either no, one or two players hire a delegate in equilibrium. We show that the decision to hire a delegate depends in a non-monotonic way on the size of the contested prize. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Keywords: Contest; Delegation; Multiple instruments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:131:y:2007:i:3:p:453-464

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9125-x

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