Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest
Lambert Schoonbeek
No 06C11, Research Report from University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management)
Abstract:
Abstract : We consider delegation in a rent-seeking contest with two players, where delegates have more instruments at their disposal than the main players. We endogenize both the decision to hire a delegate and the contingent fee offered to the delegates. We characterize the situations when either no, one or two players hire a delegate in equilibrium. We show that the decision to hire a delegate depends in a non-monotone way on the size of the contested prize.
Date: 2006
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Journal Article: Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gro:rugsom:06c11
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