Law-and-economics: why Gordon Tullock prefers Napoleon Bonaparte over the Duke of Wellington; and why he may end up on St. Helena

Jennis Biser

Public Choice, 2014, vol. 158, issue 1, 279 pages

Abstract: Most scholars in the field of law-and-economics lean to the view that the common law is efficient. Tullock, however, argues that the common law is inefficient and suggests dramatic modifications to the American legal system, transforming it from a common law system to a civil code system and abandoning the adversarial proceedings in favor of an inquisitorial process. This essay summarizes and critically evaluates the thrusts of Tullock’s 1988 article and his 1997 book, which, together direct a full-frontal attack on the Anglo-Saxon common law system. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Gordon Tullock; Efficiency of the common law hypothesis; English rule; American rule; Law-and-economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0083-9

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