All-pay-all aspects of political decision making

Thomas Giebe and Paul Schweinzer

Public Choice, 2014, vol. 161, issue 1, 73-90

Abstract: Decision-making processes are studied using non-standard all-pay structures. Our interest is motivated by regulatory, political, legal, military, and economic applications in which individual actions determine the consequences for a larger group or the general public. The common features of these examples are a competitive environment, a winner-takes-all reward structure, and some form of all-pay-all payment rule. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Auctions; Contests; Regulation; Conflict; C7; D7; L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Related works:
Working Paper: All-pay-all Aspects of Political Decision Making (2013)
Working Paper: All-pay aspects of decision making under public scrutiny
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:161:y:2014:i:1:p:73-90

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0127-1

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