All-pay-all Aspects of Political Decision Making
Thomas Giebe () and
No 4330, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich
We study decision making processes with non-standard all-pay structures. We motivate this interest through a group of regulatory, political, legal, military, and economic applications where individual actions determine the consequences for a larger group or the public. The common features of these examples are a competitive environment, winner-take-all reward structure, and some form of all-pay-all payment rule.
Keywords: auctions; contests; regulation; conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D70 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: All-pay-all aspects of political decision making (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4330
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