Term limits, time horizons and electoral accountability

J. Sebastian Leguizamon and George R. Crowley ()
Additional contact information
George R. Crowley: Troy University

Public Choice, 2016, vol. 168, issue 1, No 2, 23-42

Abstract: Abstract Term limits have been known to reduce electoral accountability by removing the possibility of reelection, thus affecting economic policy choices (i.e., the ‘lame duck’ effect). We show that the magnitude and statistical significance of this effect is influenced by the expected length of a future career. By using incumbent age as a proxy for expected career length, we find that the lame-duck effect is statistically observable only among those politicians with long careers ahead. Using data on US governors from 1950 to 2005, we find evidence that the influence of term limits is heterogeneous, primarily influencing young incumbents who hope to have long careers and thus have stronger incentives to remain accountable to voters. Indeed, we find little evidence of a lame-duck effect among older incumbents, suggesting that their already-shortened time horizons may offset the term limit effect.

Keywords: US States; Electoral accountability; Economic policy; Term limits; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H2 H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-016-0347-2 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:168:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0347-2

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0347-2

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().