Opportunistic politicians and fiscal outcomes: the curious case of Vorarlberg

Monika Köppl-Turyna

Public Choice, 2016, vol. 168, issue 3, No 2, 177-216

Abstract: Abstract Using a unique set of electoral rules present in the Austrian state of Vorarlberg, we explore the question ofwhether direct election of the mayor affects the size of local governments. Using difference-in-differences estimation and propensity score matching, we find evidence that direct elections of the mayor are associated with less expenditure on public administration and public personnel and higher expenditure in the visible categories of spending, i.e., transportation infrastructure and economic subsidies to firms and individuals.

Keywords: Local expenditure; Opportunistic politicians; Electoral rules; Political patronage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H72 H75 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Opportunistic politicians and fiscal outcomes: the curious case of Vorarlberg (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:168:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0355-2

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0355-2

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