Opportunistic politicians and fiscal outcomes: the curious case of Vorarlberg

Monika Köppl Turyna
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Monika Irena Köppl-Turyna

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Using a unique set of electoral rules present in the Austrian state of Vorarlberg, we explore the question whether local electoral rules affect the size of local governments. We find evidence that party--list system is associated with higher levels of expenditure and that direct elections of the mayor are associated with lower size of the public sector. The results are robust to the possibility that electoral rules might be endogenous to the local economic and geographic conditions.

Keywords: local expenditure; opportunistic politicians; electoral rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D72 H72 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-04-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-ure
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/64201/1/MPRA_paper_64201.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/65080/1/MPRA_paper_65080.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68823/1/MPRA_paper_68823.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Opportunistic politicians and fiscal outcomes: the curious case of Vorarlberg (2016)
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