Incumbent-challenger and open-seat elections in a spatial model of political competition
Public Choice, 2017, vol. 170, issue 1, 79-97
Abstract In Groseclose (Am J Political Sci 45:862–886, 2001), candidates with asymmetric valence scores and varying degrees of policy motivation simultaneously choose divergent policies. I take a version of the Groseclose model with policy-motivated candidates and extend it to allow for sequential policy announcements. This may be a suitable approach for incumbent-challenger elections because the incumbent’s policy is typically known before the challenger’s. I show that policy divergence is greater when candidates announce policies sequentially as opposed to simultaneously. I also show that policy-motivated incumbents benefit from a first-mover advantage.
Keywords: Electoral competition; Valence; First-mover advantage; Policy motivation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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