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Provoking insurgency in a federal state: theory and application to India

Jean-Paul Azam () and Kartika Bhatia
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Kartika Bhatia: The World Bank

Public Choice, 2017, vol. 170, issue 3, No 2, 183-210

Abstract: Abstract This paper presents a model of provocation in a federation, wherein the state government triggers an insurgency with a view toward acquiring control of some economic assets with the help of the central government. Some econometric support for this model is found using data on the Naxalite conflict in eight states of India. The tests performed control for endogeneity of the state government’s police force interventions. They suggest that the latter are meant to trigger the violent activity of the insurgents, so as to lure the central government into intervening and helping clear the ground for mining purposes in the lands of tribal people.

Keywords: Insurgency; Provocation; Federation; India (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H56 O53 Q38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Provoking Insurgency in a Federal State: Theory and Application to India (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Provoking Insurgency in a Federal State: Theory and Application to India (2012) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0389-5

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