Provoking Insurgency in a Federal State: Theory and Application to India

Jean-Paul Azam () and Kartika Bhatia

No 12-316, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: This paper presents a model of provocation in a federation, where the local government triggers an insurgency with a view to acquire the control of some economic assets with the help of the central government. Some econometric support for this model is found using data on the Naxalite conflict that affects eight states of India. The tests performed control for endogeneity of the local government’s police force interventions. They suggest that the latter are meant to amplify the violent activity of the insurgents, with a view to lure the central government to intervene and to help clear the ground for exploiting mineral deposits lying under the land of tribal people.

Date: 2012-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/dev/wp_tse_329.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Provoking insurgency in a federal state: theory and application to India (2017)
Working Paper: Provoking Insurgency in a Federal State: Theory and Application to India (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:26104

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().