Approval voting and Shapley ranking

Pierre Dehez () and Victor Ginsburgh

Public Choice, 2020, vol. 184, issue 3, No 10, 415-428

Abstract: Abstract Approval voting allows electors to list any number of candidates and their final scores are obtained by summing the votes cast in their favor. Equal-and-even cumulative voting instead follows the One-person-one-vote principle by endowing each elector with a single vote that may be distributed evenly among several candidates. It corresponds to satisfaction approval voting, introduced by Brams and Kilgour (in: Fara et al (eds) Voting power and procedures. Essays in honor of Dan Fesenthal and Moshé Machover, Springer, Heidelberg, 2014) as an extension of approval voting to a multiwinner election. It also corresponds to the concept of Shapley ranking, introduced by Ginsburgh and Zang (J Wine Econ 7:169–180, 2012) as the Shapley value of a cooperative game with transferable utility. In the present paper, we provide an axiomatic foundation for Shapley ranking and analyze the properties of the resulting social welfare function.

Keywords: Approval voting; Equal-and-even cumulative voting; Ranking game; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Approval voting and Shapley ranking (2019)
Working Paper: Approval voting and Shapley ranking (2019)
Working Paper: Approval voting and Shapley ranking (2018)
Working Paper: Approval Voting and Shapley Ranking (2018)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00729-w

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