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Approval Voting and Shapley Ranking

Pierre Dehez () and Victor Ginsburgh ()

No 2018-09, Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: Approval voting allows voters to list any number of candidates. Their scores are obtained by summing the votes cast in their favor. Fractional voting instead follows the One-person-onevote principle by endowing voters with a single vote that they may freely distribute among candidates. In this paper, we show that to be fair, such a ranking requires a uniform distribution. It corresponds to Shapley ranking that was introduced to rank wines as the Shapley value of a cooperative game with transferable utility. We analyze the properties of these "ranking games" and provide an axiomatic foundation to Shapley ranking. We also analyze Shapley ranking as a social welfare function and compare it to approval ranking.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-pol and nep-upt
Date: 2018-04
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