Approval Voting and Shapley Ranking
Pierre Dehez () and
Victor Ginsburgh ()
No 2018-09, Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles
Approval voting allows voters to list any number of candidates. Their scores are obtained by summing the votes cast in their favor. Fractional voting instead follows the One-person-onevote principle by endowing voters with a single vote that they may freely distribute among candidates. In this paper, we show that to be fair, such a ranking requires a uniform distribution. It corresponds to Shapley ranking that was introduced to rank wines as the Shapley value of a cooperative game with transferable utility. We analyze the properties of these "ranking games" and provide an axiomatic foundation to Shapley ranking. We also analyze Shapley ranking as a social welfare function and compare it to approval ranking.
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Working Paper: Approval voting and Shapley ranking (2018)
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