Long live the doge? Death as a term limit on Venetian chief executives
Daniel Smith,
George R. Crowley () and
J. Sebastian Leguizamon
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George R. Crowley: Troy University
Public Choice, 2021, vol. 188, issue 3, No 3, 333-359
Abstract:
Abstract Can an electorate use the projected life expectancy of a lifetime-appointed chief executive to enforce binding, informal term limits? Informal term limits based on the life expectancy of a chief executive candidate at election would enable an electorate to exercise discretion in adjusting tenure lengths to minimize expected turnover and tenure-length costs, while also providing a strictly binding term limit: death. We provide a detailed historical case study of Venice from 1172 to 1797, when the ruling patricians utilized informal term limits on their chief executive, the doge, relying on the projected life expectancy of ducal candidates.
Keywords: Economic history; Public choice; Term limits; Venice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H1 N4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:188:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-020-00829-y
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-020-00829-y
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