The flip side of power

Friedel Bolle and Philipp E. Otto ()
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Philipp E. Otto: European University Viadrina

Public Choice, 2022, vol. 190, issue 1, No 4, 75-92

Abstract: Abstract In random voting, the committee chair, whose vote decides in the case of a draw, is more often decisive than ordinary voters. Therefore, in the power indices literature, the committee chair is said to be more powerful. Players with a veto right are even more powerful still. Similarly, the production of threshold public goods may involve “tie-breaking players” (with more effective contributions) and “veto players” (specialists or larger players) whose contributions are necessary. We pose the question of whether power is beneficial for an individual. Except in the equilibrium where no player contributes, veto players are disadvantaged while tie-breaking players can be advantaged. In experiments with otherwise symmetric players, about 80% of the veto players contribute, but tie-breaking players also contribute almost as frequently as veto players, and significantly more frequently than ordinary players. Even with three times the costs of ordinary players, veto players stick to their behavior, while tie-breaking players reduce their contributions below those of ordinary players. Overall, powerful players always are worse off than ordinary players; thus, power seems not to pay off herein.

Keywords: Veto players; Tie-breaking power; Binary threshold public goods; Voting games; Choice experiments; D71; D72; H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Working Paper: The flip side of power (2017)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-021-00916-8

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