The flip side of power
Friedel Bolle and
Philipp E. Otto ()
Additional contact information
Philipp E. Otto: European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder)
No 26, Discussion Paper Series RECAP15 from RECAP15, European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder)
Based on power indices as well as intuition, the chairman of a committee whose vote decides in the case of a draw has more power than ordinary voters. Even more powerful are members with veto right, who can block a majority vote. We pose the question whether giving one of the players in a majority voting game more power is beneficial for the powerful individual and/or the community. We find that, in our environment, the introduction of a powerful player is efficiency-improving, but that powerful players earn less than their ordinary co-players. Our environment is a Binary Threshold Public Good game which can also be interpreted as a general non- cooperative voting game. We supplement our investigation by successfully explaining behavior as a finite mixture of mostly equilibrium strategies.
Keywords: veto power; tie-breaking power; binary threshold public goods; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.europa-uni.de/de/forschung/institut/re ... ds/recap15_DP026.pdf First version, 2017 (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:euv:dpaper:26
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion Paper Series RECAP15 from RECAP15, European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Daniel Becker ().