Decentralized revenue sharing from broadcasting sports

Gustavo Bergantiños and Juan Moreno-Ternero

Public Choice, 2023, vol. 194, issue 1, No 2, 27-44

Abstract: Abstract We study the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues among participating clubs. First, we characterize the set of rules satisfying two basic axioms: anonymity and additivity. Then, we decentralize the problem by letting clubs vote for rules. No majority equilibrium exists when they are allowed to vote for any rule within the characterized set. However, if the set is restricted in a meaningful and plausible way (just replacing anonymity by equal treatment of equals), majority equilibrium does exist.

Keywords: Resource allocation; Broadcasting problems; Voting; Majority; Anonymity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-022-01015-y

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