Decentralized revenue sharing from broadcasting sports

Gustavo Bergantiños (gustavo.bergantino@gmail.com) and Juan Moreno-Ternero
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Gustavo Bergantiños: ECOSOT, Universidade de Vigo

No 23.02, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues among participating clubs. First, we characterize the set of rules satisfying two basic axioms: anonymity and additivity. Then, we decentralize the problem letting clubs vote for rules. No majority equilibrium exists when they are allowed to vote for any rule within the characterized set. Nevertheless, if the set is restricted in a meaningful and plausible way (just replacing anonymity by equal treatment of equals) majority equilibrium does exist.

Keywords: Resource allocation; broadcasting problems; voting; majority; anonymity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cul, nep-des and nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: Decentralized revenue sharing from broadcasting sports (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pab:wpaper:23.02

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