Deterrence, settlement, and litigation under adversarial versus inquisitorial systems

Alice Guerra (), Maria Maraki (), Baptiste Massenot () and Christian Thöni
Additional contact information
Alice Guerra: University of Bologna
Maria Maraki: FDCA, University of Lausanne
Baptiste Massenot: TBS Business School

Public Choice, 2023, vol. 196, issue 3, No 6, 356 pages

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we compare deterrence, settlement, and litigation spending under adversarial and inquisitorial systems. We present a basic litigation model with three sequential stages—care, settlement, litigation—and we test the predictions on experimental data. In line with our theoretical expectations, we find that, compared with the adversarial system, the inquisitorial system is associated with lower litigation spending, lower rates of cases settled, and tends to strengthen deterrence.

Keywords: Procedural economy; Law & economics; Adversarial system; Inquisitorial system; Litigation; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 K13 K15 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:196:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-022-01001-4

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-022-01001-4

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