Variation of the electorate: Veto and purge

Roy Gardner

Public Choice, 1983, vol. 40, issue 3, 237-247

Abstract: In the paradigm social choice problem, there is a fixed set of alternatives and a fixed set of voters. This essay considers variations of the electorate when some subset of voters has a special voice on some subset of alternatives. We formalized such a situation by means of the veto function. We focus on stable veto functions, exhibit a stable liberal social choice function and promotion mechanism, and investigate a notion of stability for groups whose membership itself is the social state. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1983

Date: 1983
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Working Paper: Variation of the Electorate: Veto and Purge (1981)
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00114521

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