Variation of the Electorate: Veto and Purge

Roy Gardner

ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In the paradigm social choice problem, there is a fixed set of alternatives and a fixed set of voters. This paper considers variations of the electorate, when some subset of voters has a special voice on some subset of alternatives. Such a situation is formalized by means of the veto function. We focus on stable veto functions, and exhibit a liberal social choice function and a promotion mechanism which are stable. A notion of stability for groups whose membership itself is the social state is investigated. The latter is useful in analyzing the membership of the Politburo of the Communist Party (USSR), 1926-1930.

Date: 1981-01-01
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Journal Article: Variation of the electorate: Veto and purge (1983)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genstf:198101010800001114

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