When Groups Contribute to a Public Good: The Importance of Institutional Framework for Making Collective Decisions

Gaute Torsvik

Public Choice, 1994, vol. 80, issue 1-2, 54 pages

Abstract: In this paper, the author discusses how the institutional framework for making collective decisions influences the outcome of a game where groups contribute to a public good. Representative democracy invites each group to act strategically in the election of representatives. The author shows that this strategic effect reinforces 'the tragedy of the common.' The society--all groups taken together--has, therefore, incentives to restrict groups from making collective decisions through a system of representation. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1994
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Working Paper: When Groups Contribute to a Public Good: The Importance of Institutional Framework for Making Collective Decisions (1990)
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