Lobbying When the Decisionmaker Can Acquire Independent Information: A Comment

Randolph Sloof

Public Choice, 1997, vol. 91, issue 2, 199-207

Abstract: In this comment, it is argued that the game-theoretical analysis presented by E. Rasmusen (1993) is incomplete. First, a short description of his model is given, then a proposition stating all equilibria of the model is presented. The proposition supplements the analysis of Rasmusen by showing that an, in the author's view plausible, equilibrium is ignored. Thereupon a comprehensive equilibrium analysis leads the author to qualify Rasmusen's argument; lobbying does not always fully substitute for independent investigation, truthful lobbying is not necessarily successful, and a lobbyist having the right information does not always get his way. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1997
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