Human Capital, Committee Power and Legislative Outcomes

Jason Saving

Public Choice, 1997, vol. 92, issue 3-4, 16 pages

Abstract: This paper presents a model in which legislators use informational asymmetries to engage in rent-seeking behavior. Previous work in the informational and distributive traditions could not explain deviations from the median preference without reference to 'committee power.' Integration of these forces demonstrated that legislative outcomes need not correspond to the median preference regardless of the extent to which committee power is present in a legislature. While deviations from the median preference are consistent with committee power, recent empirical evidence suggests that observed deviations in Congress are in fact caused by human capital differentials rather than committee power. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1997
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