Empirical Evidence on a Special-Interest-Group Perspective to Antitrust

Delorme, Charles D,, W Frame and David R Kamerschen

Public Choice, 1997, vol. 92, issue 3-4, 317-35

Abstract: While the antitrust laws claim to serve the public interest, they are susceptible to the influence of special-interest groups as are any public policies. This paper extends the empirical literature regarding the special-interest theory of antitrust. The authors' additional empirical evidence addresses some of the shortcomings in previous approaches. In particular, they conduct a more rigorous statistical examination. This paper separates two crucial issues. First, what happened to prices and output from 1880 to 1900, prior to and following passage of the Sherman Act in 1890? Second, what do these empirical results mean for the origin, history, and development of antitrust? Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1997
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