Identification in english auctions with shill bidding

Guillermo Marshall

Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), 2024, vol. 22, issue 2, No 3, 193-222

Abstract: Abstract What can we learn from auction data when the seller submits shill bids to inflate the auction price? I study identification in an incomplete model of an English auction with shill bidding in the context of independent private values. I show that the distribution of valuations is partially identified (as is the optimal reserve price), and I provide bounds for the distribution of valuations that hold even when the seller is not engaging in shill bidding. I apply these results to a sample of eBay auctions.

Keywords: Auctions; Partial identification; Shill bidding; eBay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C57 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s11129-023-09274-9

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