Worksharing and Access Discounts in the Postal Sector with Asymmetric Information*

Joan Calzada

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2006, vol. 29, issue 1, 69-102

Abstract: This paper analyzes the optimal worksharing and access amounts granted to mailers and entrants in a liberalized postal sector when there is asymmetric information about the Post Office’s (PO) costs. I show that when the regulator is unable to ascertain which part of the total cost of sorting has to be attributed to each sorting facility, the optimal “access discount” given to entrants is set in a pro-competitive way. This facilitates the entry of firms that are less efficient than the PO. However, the optimal “worksharing discount” may prevent the entry of mailers that are more efficient than the PO. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Keywords: access pricing; worksharing discounts; competition; postal; D43; L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11149-005-5126-9 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Worksharing and access discounts in the postal sector with asymmetrics information (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:regeco:v:29:y:2006:i:1:p:69-102

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... on/journal/11149/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11149-005-5126-9

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Regulatory Economics is currently edited by Menaham Spiegel

More articles in Journal of Regulatory Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().