Worksharing and access discounts in the postal sector with asymmetrics information

Joan Calzada

No 112, Working Papers in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia

Abstract: This paper analyses the optimal worksharing discount granted to mailers and entrants in a liberalized postal sector when there is asymmetric information about the Post Offices costs. When the regulator is unable to ascertain which part of the total cost of sorting has to be attributed to each sorting facility, the optimal access discount given to the entrants is set in a procompetitive way, thus facilitating the entry of firms that are less efficient than the Post Office. However, with the same asymmetry of information, the optimal worksharing discount given to the mailers is set to favor the Post Office, even when it is less efficient than the mailers in providing the sorting.

JEL-codes: L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
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Related works:
Journal Article: Worksharing and Access Discounts in the Postal Sector with Asymmetric Information* (2006)
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