Fixed-mobile integration

Steffen Hoernig, Marc Bourreau and Carlo Cambini ()

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2014, vol. 45, issue 1, 57-74

Abstract: Fixed-line incumbents often also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this joint ownership on market outcomes. Our model predicts that while fixed-to-mobile call prices to the integrated mobile network are more efficient than under separation, those to rival mobile networks are distorted upwards, amplifying any incumbency advantage. This result is robust to changes in the competitiveness of the fixed market and to the presence of fixed-mobile substitution. As concerns potential remedies, a uniform off-net pricing constraint leads to higher welfare than functional separation, and even allows to maintain some of the efficiency gains. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Network competition; On/off-net pricing; Integration; Call externality; L51; L92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11149-013-9230-y (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Fixed-mobile integration (2014)
Working Paper: Fixed-Mobile Integration (2013)
Working Paper: Fixed-mobile integration (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:regeco:v:45:y:2014:i:1:p:57-74

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... on/journal/11149/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11149-013-9230-y

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Regulatory Economics is currently edited by Menaham Spiegel

More articles in Journal of Regulatory Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().