Steffen Hoernig (),
Marc Bourreau () and
FEUNL Working Paper Series from Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia
Often, fixed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this joint ownership on market outcomes. Our model predicts that while fixed-to-mobile call prices to the integrated mobile network are more efficient than under separation, those to rival mobile networks are distorted upwards, amplifying any incumbency advantage. As concerns potential remedies, a uniform off-net pricing constraint leads to higher welfare than functional separation and even allows to maintain some of the efficiency gains. JEL codes: L51, L92
Keywords: Network competition; On/off-net pricing; Integration; Call externality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-net and nep-reg
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Journal Article: Fixed-mobile integration (2014)
Working Paper: Fixed-mobile integration (2014)
Working Paper: Fixed-Mobile Integration (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp574
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