Resale Price Maintenance Post Leegin: A Model of RPM Incentives

William S. Comanor () and David Salant
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William S. Comanor: University of California

Review of Industrial Organization, 2017, vol. 50, issue 2, No 4, 169-179

Abstract: Abstract The prominent Babies R Us decision (McDonough et al. v. Toys R Us, Inc., 2009) was the first to explore the economic consequences of resale price maintenance after the Supreme Court’s Leegin decision. Previously, litigation concerned the presence or absence of an agreement; but that changed with the new jurisprudence which instead emphasized the restraint’s direct anti-competitive effects. While the district court’s decision in the Babies R Us case rested on the factual circumstances of the case, it did not have before it an economic model through which those facts could be integrated. This paper offers such a model, the predicates of which are drawn from the case. The conclusions derived from the model are entirely consistent with the court’s decision

Keywords: Leegin decision; RPM incentives; Dominant distributors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Working Paper: Resale price maintenance post Leegin: A model of rpm incentives (2016)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-016-9558-4

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