Resale price maintenance post Leegin: A model of rpm incentives

William Comanor and David Salant

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The prominent Babies R Us decision (McDonough et al., v. Toys R US, Inc., 2009) was the first to explore the economic consequences of resale price maintenance after the Supreme Court’s Leegin Decision. Previously, litigation concerned the presence or absence of an agreement; but that changed with the new jurisprudence which instead emphasized the restraint’s direct anti-competitive effects. While the district court’s decision in the Babies R Us case rested on the factual circumstances of the case, it did not have before it an economic model through which those facts could be integrated. This paper offers such a mode, the predicates of which are drawn from the case. The conclusions that are drawn from the model are fully consistent with the court’s decision

Keywords: Leegin Decision; RPM Incentives; Dominant Distributors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
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Related works:
Journal Article: Resale Price Maintenance Post Leegin: A Model of RPM Incentives (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:75574

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