On Bundling and Entry Deterrence

Andrea Greppi () and Domenico Menicucci
Additional contact information
Andrea Greppi: Università degli Studi di Bologna

Review of Industrial Organization, 2021, vol. 58, issue 4, No 4, 581 pages

Abstract: Abstract A multiproduct incumbent firm faces the threat of entry from another multiproduct (generalist) firm or from single-product (specialist) firms. Assuming that the incumbent offers higher quality products than its rivals, we inquire whether the possibility of bundling by the incumbent is more effective in deterring entry in one setting or the other, and explore how the quality difference affects the comparison. For instance, for relatively high-quality differences the generalist is more vulnerable to bundling than are the specialists; but bundling is a credible action for the incumbent more often against specialists than against the generalist.

Keywords: Competitive bundling; Entry deterrence; Vertical differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11151-020-09785-9 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: On bundling and entry deterrence (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:revind:v:58:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s11151-020-09785-9

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... on/journal/11151/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11151-020-09785-9

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Industrial Organization is currently edited by L.J. White

More articles in Review of Industrial Organization from Springer, The Industrial Organization Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().