On bundling and entry deterrence

Andrea Greppi and Domenico Menicucci

Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Abstract: A multiproduct dominant firm faces the threat of entry from another multiproduct firm or from single-product firms. We inquire whether the possibility of bundling by the dominant firm is more effective in deterring entry in one setting or the other. We extend the analysis of a model in Hurkens et al. (2018) to explore how the dominance level affects the comparison. For instance, for intermediate dominance levels an integrated firm is more vulnerable to bundling than separate firms, but bundling is a credible action for the dominant firm more often when it faces separate rivals than an integrated rival.

Keywords: Competitive Bundling; Entry deterrence. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.disei.unifi.it/upload/sub/pubblicazioni/repec/pdf/wp26_2018.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On Bundling and Entry Deterrence (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2018_26.rdf

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa Via delle Pandette 9 50127 - Firenze - Italy. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Giorgio Ricchiuti (giorgio.ricchiuti@unifi.it).