Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited

Francoise Forges

Theory and Decision, 2006, vol. 61, issue 4, 329-344

Abstract: A mistake in “Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium (CE) in games with incomplete informationâ€\x9D motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced. Copyright Springer 2006

Keywords: Bayesian rationality; correlated equilibrium; games with incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (48)

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Working Paper: Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited (2006)
Working Paper: Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited (2006)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-006-9005-3

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