Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited

Francoise Forges

No 2006041, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: A mistake in “Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information” motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced.

Date: 2006-05
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Related works:
Journal Article: Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited (2006)
Working Paper: Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited (2006)
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