Minimum cost spanning tree games and spillover stability

Ruud Hendrickx (), Jacco Thijssen and Peter Borm

Theory and Decision, 2012, vol. 73, issue 3, 451 pages

Abstract: This article discusses interactive minimum cost spanning tree problems and argues that the standard approach of using a transferable utility game to come up with a fair allocation of the total costs has some flaws. A new model of spillover games is presented, in which each player’s decision whether or not to cooperate is properly taken into account. Copyright The Author(s) 2012

Keywords: Minimum cost spanning tree problems; Transferable utility games; Spillovers; C71; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-011-9262-7

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