Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games and Spillover Stability

Ruud Hendrickx, Jacco Thijssen and Peter Borm

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York

Abstract: This paper discusses minimum cost spanning tree games and argues that the standard approach of using a transferable utility game to come up with a fair allocation of the total costs has some flaws. A new model of spillover games is presented, in which each agent's decision whether or not to cooperate is properly taken into account.

Keywords: minimum cost spanning tree problems; transferable utility games; spillovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Journal Article: Minimum cost spanning tree games and spillover stability (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yor:yorken:11/02

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