Delegation and motivation

Lukas Angst and Karol Borowiecki

Theory and Decision, 2014, vol. 76, issue 3, 363-393

Abstract: We investigate the determinants of decision rights transfer and its effects on the motivation of an agent. The study is based on a laboratory experiment conducted on 130 subjects playing an innovative principal–agent game. Interestingly, the results show that agents do not favour a delegation and a decision is considered rather burdensome. Although the experiment could not give support for the behavioural hypothesis of higher effort provided by participants who receive choice subsequently, the survey illuminates the interaction between delegation motives, effort motivators, goals and other perceptions of the agents. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Organizational behaviour; Incentives; Experiments and contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Working Paper: Delegation and Motivation (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:76:y:2014:i:3:p:363-393

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-013-9370-7

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