Delegation and Motivation

Lukas Angst and Karol Borowiecki
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Lukas Angst: Department of Economics, University of Zurich

Economic Papers from Trinity College Dublin, Economics Department

Abstract: In this article we study the determinants of decision rights transfer and its effects on the motivation of an agent. The study is based on a laboratory experiment conducted on 130 subjects playing an innovative principal-agent game. Interestingly, the results show that agents do not favour a delegation and a decision is considered rather burdensome. Although the experiment could not give support for the behavioural hypothesis of higher effort provided by participants who receive choice subsequently, the survey illuminates the interaction between delegation motives, effort motivators, goals and other perceptions of the agents.

Keywords: organizational behavior; incentives; experiments and contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D23 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2011-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hrm
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https://www.tcd.ie/Economics/TEP/2011/TEP1611.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Delegation and motivation (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tcd:tcduee:tep1611

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